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Gender diversity on Boards of Directors and business success 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between gender diversity on Boards of Directors and business success. For this 
purpose, the authors used one sample of companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. The paper analyzes a period 
of three years, between 2005 and 2007. A descriptive analysis has been carried out. Women’s labor status has been 
studied in these three years. The paper also covers a panel analysis. The results show that there are few women in deci-
sion-making positions, and Gender diversity and business success are not related. 
Keywords: business success, gender diversity, performance, government committees. 
JEL Classification: M48. 
Introduction© 
Companies and their behavior are strongly influ-
enced by factors such as the economic environment, 
industry sector, and their specific characteristics. 
Nowadays, the economy is going through a very 
unstable situation due to a global crisis. In this con-
text, companies must struggle to be competitive and 
flexible in order to adapt themselves to the situation. 
Therefore, it is important to know those variables 
that drive some companies to obtain better results. 
We will focus on business success using performance. 
An increasing number of academic contributions 
reveal that gender diversity research enjoys a good 
deal of interest and development. Articles are often 
linked to decision-making areas. Research is trying 
to relate how diversity affects business performance. 
However, a review of the literature shows contradic-
tory results. Some publications place together diver-
sity and negative performance (Shrader et al., 1997; 
Pelled et al., 1999). Other publications that prove 
gender diversity has a positive link with perform-
ance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhart et al., 2003; Bonn et 
al., 2004), but there are also some publications 
which conclude that gender diversity and perform-
ance are not related at all (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; 
Randøy, Thomsen et al., 2006; Rose, 2007).  
In the Spanish case, Fernández et al. (2004) found a 
positive stock market reaction to announcements 
about the adoption of good corporate governance 
practices. These practices are contained in the 
“Olivencia Report”. The report was based on data 
gathered from 75 listed companies, during the pe-
riod of 1998-2000.  
The current code of “good corporate governance 
practices” was developed in 2006 by the National 
Securities Market. This code includes a recommen-
dation for greater gender diversity on Boards of 
companies. Its implementation is not compulsory 
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(art. 116), although companies not implementing it 
have to justify the reasons why they do not do so. 
De Luis et al. (2007) consider that the stock market 
will ultimately value compliance with good corpo-
rate governance practices. It is supposed that 
companies which do implement such practices 
shall be rewarded. The rest of the companies 
could be questioned. 
Nowadays, Spanish Government and diverse regula-
tors are wondering about the scarcity of women on 
Spanish Boards. Spain has one of the lowest levels 
of diversity in the European Community (Heidrick 
and Struggles, 2005). Olcese et al. (2005) pointed 
out only 4% of Board Members in listed companies 
were women. Mateos et al. (2006), also indicate that 
women represent only 6.6% of the positions on the 
Boards of Directors of the 1,150 largest Spanish 
companies. 
For these reasons, we propose: 
? That an increase of female representation may 
achieve a better balance of equal opportunities. 
? That it is necessary to establish if the practice of 
good corporate governance is related to com-
pany performance.  
? That further studies about the stock market reac-
tion to the announcements of the incorporation 
of women onto the Board of Directors of com-
panies may lead to better results. 
? Therefore, the purpose of this study is to deter-
mine whether gender diversity influences suc-
cess in decision-making positions within com-
panies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
For this purpose, a descriptive study was carried out 
about the representation of women in decision-
making positions. And secondly, a statistical tech-
nique has been applied to the empirical test of the 
hypothesis. Both of them are exposed with a view to 
testing the aim of this paper. 
Thus, the presence of women in decision-making 
positions of the companies depends on: 
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? Firm size.  
? The size of the Board of Directors. 
? The number of Board meetings throughout the 
year. 
We will not able to affirm that there is a direct rela-
tionship between the presence of women in a com-
pany and business success. All of this on the basis 
of assuming that the presence of women in positions 
of responsibility is very limited, as we will show in 
the descriptive study. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers 
the concept of gender diversity. Section 2 presents a 
description of the methodology used in the empiri-
cal study. A descriptive analysis will show the pres-
ence of women on Boards and in top management. 
Also, the relationship between women at the top and 
business success will be tested. The results of the 
above analysis are shown in Section 3. Finally, the 
last Section of the paper considers the conclusions 
and implications of the study. 
1. Gender diversity 
Corporate diversity is defined as the variation of the 
age, race, ethnicity, gender, and social/cultural iden-
tities among employees within a specific corpora-
tion (Marimuthu, 2008).  
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) defined diversity in 
the composition of the Board as the varied combina-
tion of attributes, characteristics and skills that their 
members have. This definition is also applied to the 
top management of an organization. 
Women and minorities have historically been under-
represented on corporate boards of directors but this 
began to change in the 1990s (Farrell and Hersch, 
2005). Usually two categories of diversity are con-
sidered. The first one is demographic diversity. This 
type is observable, because it is based on easily 
detectable factors, such as sex, race or level of edu-
cation. The second type cannot be observed, and 
needs cognitive considerations because it refers to 
non-visible attributes such as knowledge, skills, 
profiles and individual capabilities (Pelled, 1996; 
Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
Much of the research about diversity is articulated in 
demographic terms. The reason for this is that there 
are reliable databases which make objective meas-
urement possible (Rosenzweig, 1998). Milliken and 
Martins (1996) find that demographic variables 
provide objective and valid representations of at-
tributes related to non-observable diversity attrib-
utes, such as risk aversion and proactivity. There-
fore, many empirical studies assume that cognitive 
variables are correlated systematically with demo-
graphic variables (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; 
Smith, 2007; Rose, 2007). As a result, gender diver-
sity has generated a considerable amount of litera-
ture related to demographic diversity. One of the 
most frequent approaches is focusing on distribu-
tions by gender. Gender imbalance is a fact, whether 
at work or within a profession. This also happens in 
almost every geographical area. 
In many recent studies, the theoretical framework 
takes good corporate governance to be central. 
Some of those works include references to the code 
reforms (Carrasco and Laffarga, 2006; 2007a; 
2007b; Ruigrok et al. 2006). So, the existence of 
rejection on the basis of gender to the boards would 
be a symptom of poor corporate governance. More-
over, the connection between good corporate govern-
ance and performance is highlighted in the financial 
literature. Besides, the composition of boards has 
been extensively analyzed. Normally, studies have 
used agency theory and focused on the characteristic 
of “independence”. In fact, major developments in this 
area link characteristics of the Board of Directors to 
the performance of the company. However, Carter et 
al. (2003) highlight that dominant theories are not 
conclusive in the study of corporate governance. 
These theories do not reveal that more diversity 
causes a significant impact on performance. Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003) suggest that no single theory 
offers, by itself, a comprehensive framework to make 
a solid link between diversity and performance. This is 
obviously due to the multidisciplinary nature of the 
topic, though some aspects of these theories could 
be used under different circumstances. Therefore, 
studies about diversity are based on agency theory, 
stakeholder’s theory and resource dependence the-
ory, which are also applied in studies about corpo-
rate governance. 
Agency theory is the main theoretical approach un-
derlying the idea that a more diverse board may 
improve performance. As a theory, it has launched 
one of the most productive areas in business litera-
ture. Agency theory suggests an inherent imperfec-
tion in the relationship between capital providers 
(principals) and fiduciaries (agents) of that capital. It 
is a long-held concept which argues that when cor-
porate ownership is separated from corporate man-
agement, behaviors, decisions, and actions by man-
agers will deviate from those required to maximize 
shareholder value. In other words, agency theory 
assumes a divergency between the interests of cor-
porate managers and those of shareholders (Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Coles and 
Hesterly, 2000). Asymmetric information and in-
complete contracts lead to agency conflicts between 
capital providers and managers. These conflicts 
have associated costs. To the extent that certain 
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internal factors (corporate governance structures) 
reduce these costs, they might give an impulse to-
wards a better performance. Weak corporate gov-
ernance causes agency costs and, consequently, a 
poorer performance (Core et al., 2006). Hillman and 
Daziel (2003) suggest that Boards are the key to 
aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. 
This is the reason to consider gender diversity on 
Boards as a tool for reducing agency costs and, thus, 
improving performance. This argument is only ac-
ceptable if heterogeneous Boards are thought of as a 
tool for better control. This control depends on an 
expansion of points of view. 
The Spanish case is different. Research in agency 
theory has been based on the U.S. model. Large-
sized companies and dispersed ownership were 
used. Companies are family-owned structures or 
present a more concentrated ownership. Therefore, 
agency conflict between ownership and manage-
ment are not so relevant. Moreover, the impact of 
reducing the associated costs is hardly significant. 
On the contrary, dependence on outside resources, 
or stakeholders, may prove crucial to survival or 
success. Smaller-sized firms do not experience a 
significant agency problem either (Forbes y Mil-
liken, 1999). The Board does not control in a con-
ventional way. Property rights and management are 
held by the same people. This is most evident in 
firms with an entrepreneurial profile. Nevertheless, 
all these limitations are not applicable to our sam-
ple. Our study is based on data from major compa-
nies listed on the Stock Exchange. 
Based on the reasons above, some studies are fo-
cused on theoretical assumptions that explain the 
impact of diversity in the context of small and me-
dium firms. Along these lines, different authors 
suggest the base is the impact of diversity on re-
source dependence theory, coming into the category 
of research on organizational behavior (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependence theory is used 
to analyze Board functions and actions (Gabrielsson 
and Huse, 2004). Thus, the focus of the relationship 
between ownership and management is shifted to 
the links of the company with its environment.  
According to this framework, Boards are part of the 
organizations and their environment, and by provid-
ing the organization with information and resources, 
Boards help to create a cushion against an uncertain 
environment. This viewpoint suggests that, on an 
individual basis, Board members bring resources to 
the organization as a result of their backgrounds. In 
addition to the environmental perspective, a second 
framework argues that board members perform an 
internal control function and, through administrative 
efforts, can influence organizational efficiency. Both 
viewpoints suggest that properly structured govern-
ing boards have the potential to influence organiza-
tional outcomes. Earlier studies provided some em-
pirical support for this relationship, particularly with 
regards to Board member occupation and gender 
(Siciliano, 1996). 
Predictions about performance are similar to those 
of the agency theory if applied to gender diversity 
on Boards. In this context, diversity would expand 
to profiles of the directors, for example, in order to 
improve relations with competitors and customers, 
knowledge about the sector or possibilities of finan-
cial access. In short, an increase in the procuring of 
critical resources will lead to better performance. 
The dependent resource function will be very rele-
vant in obtaining external financing for companies 
that lack access to capital markets (Voordeckers et 
al, 2007). Fryxell and Lerner (1989) suggest a need 
to develop a stakeholder theory of representation 
which may help to explain when underrepresented 
groups may make additional progress and interven-
tion may be needed. Such a theory needs to link 
industry structural variables to the need for corpo-
rate responsiveness to specific stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholder theory takes into account the interests 
of other agents associated with the firm (employees, 
customers, suppliers, banks, etc.). This theory is not 
only linked to interests of stakeholders. Recent lit-
erature has highlighted the contribution of the 
stakeholder approach to creating business value 
(Berman et al., 1999). 
Gender diversity and presence of women on the 
Board of Directors could be considered good indica-
tors of social responsibility. This could also be a 
signal oriented to stakeholders (Oakley, 2000; Ibra-
him and Angelidis, 1994; Webb, 2004) on the cha-
racteristic of “independence”. In fact, major devel-
opments in this area link characteristics of Board of 
Directors to performance of the company. However, 
Carter et al. (2003) highlight that dominant theories 
are not conclusive in the study of corporate govern-
ance. These theories do not reveal that more diver-
sity causes a significant impact on performance. 
Hillman et al. (2002) point out that greater gender 
diversity on the Board allows for more open gov-
ernment processes. These processes will guarantee 
stakeholder interests.  
From a strategic perspective, one of the most impor-
tant intangible resources for competitive advantage 
is corporate reputation (perception of stakeholders) 
(Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Several studies have 
explored the effects specific social and/or ethical 
responsibility issues may have on corporate reputation. 
While some of those works used “resource-based” or 
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“social identity” theories (De Luis et al., 2007), it is 
diversity that is distinctly and favourably viewed by 
analysts and institutional investors (Carter et al., 2003) 
and, subsequently, considered a relevant dimen-
sion (Berman et al., 1999). Since people or groups 
interested in establishing contracts with the firm 
will not need to incur additional costs to increase 
monitoring, good reputation could thus be materialized 
in profitability, or even in cost of debt reduction (Kang 
et al., 2007; Tacheva and Huse, 2006).  
2. Methodology 
2.1. Research question. The aim of this paper is to 
analyze whether gender diversity could be a com-
pany success variable, by considering agency theory, 
stakeholders theory, and resource dependence theory. 
Every theory offers a comprehensive framework on its 
own building relationships between diversity and per-
formance. But various elements of theories can be 
applied in different circumstances. We tested the 
relationship between women on decision-making 
positions and business success. The hypothesis to be 
tested is presented below.  
H0: Women on decision-making positions are not 
related to business success. 
2.2. Sample. The sample used in the analysis covers 
companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
The database used is the Sistema de Análisis de 
Balances Ibéricos (SABI). 146 companies were 
analyzed. SABI offers financial information of each 
company. The analysis period is 2005-2007. Finan-
cial ratios were calculated for all this period. Since 
additional data were needed (for example, number 
of women and men in decision-making positions), 
corporate governance reports were also used to pro-
vide data. 
The following filters were applied to the initial sample: 
? Financial firms were eliminated. Their Balance 
sheet structure and operating income statement are 
different to those of the other companies in the 
sample. This type of firms could probably distort 
the analysis. So, 13 banks were eliminated. 
? If equity was higher than zero was observed. All 
companies meet this requirement. In this case, 
none of them were eliminated. 
? Companies with lost accounting data were re-
moved. Exactly, 35 companies were deleted. 
Also, firms that had extreme values were elimi-
nated, since they distort the results. In total 15 com-
panies were removed. 
Therefore, after applying filters, the final sample 
consisted of 98 companies and 294 observations. 
This sample was chosen for different reasons. First, 
it is a set of large companies, the most important in 
the Spanish stock market. In this sense, large corpo-
rations are firms politically hard-pressed to meet the 
minimum requirements in relation to gender parity, 
so the inclusion of women in greater or lesser degree 
probably reflects a conscious choice. Second, the sam-
ple size is statistically significant, with enough varia-
tion to have reliable statistical inferences. Third, the 
study allows conclusions to be drawn about the most 
important Spanish companies with greater incentives 
to carry out a policy of inclusion and promotion of 
women in leading positions of corporate responsibility. 
2.3. Variables. The variables selected for analysis 
are listed in Table 1. The dependent variable is 
WOMEN. The review of the literature suggests sev-
eral alternatives to determine the diversity measure. 
According to literature review, we have calculated 
the percentage of women on decision-making posi-
tions (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 
2004). This percentage is the ratio between the 
number of women on the Board and top managers 
divided into the total number of people on the Board 
and top managers. 
There are four independent variables proposed. All 
of them are indicators of business performance. 
They are: the variables of Tobin's Q market and 
sales growth, (i.e., Carter et al., 2003; Rose, 2007) 
ROA and ROE (i.e., Smith et al., 2006; Erhardt et 
al., 2003). The control variables are size of the 
Board (i.e., Yermack, 1996; Andrés et al., 2005), 
sector of activity (i.e., Vafeas, 1999) and Board of 
Directors independence (i.e., Pearce and Zahra, 
1992; Bozec and Dia, 2007). Company size is also 
considered. 
Table 1. Dependent, independent and  
control variables 
Denomination Type Definition 
Dependent variable 
WOMEN Numerical
Percentage of women members of the 
Board of Directors and top management 
Independent Variables 
ROA Numerical Return on assets 
ROE Numerical Return on equity 
GSALES Numerical
Formed from the difference between sales1 
and sales0 divided into sales0 
QTOBIN  Numerical
Formed from the ratio of market value of the 
company and the replacement cost of 
assets 
Control variables 
SECTOR Numerical
Classification of the companies based on 
list provided by the Madrid Stock Exchange  
SIZE Numerical
Firm size measured by the logarithm of total 
assets 
BDTMSIZE Numerical
Number of members on Board of Directors 
and top management (Board of Directors 
and top management size) 
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Table 1 (cont.). Dependent, independent and  
control variables 
DUALITY Dichotomous 
Dummy, takes value 1 if the Chief Executive 
serves as Chairman of the Board of Direc-
tors, taking value 0 otherwise (Independency 
of Board of Directors) 
MEETINGS Numerical 
Number of meetings of the Board of Direc-
tors (activity of the Boards of Directors) 
PERNONEXE Numerical 
Percentage of non-executive members on 
Board of Directors (Independency of Board 
of Directors) 
2.4. Empirical development. To test the hypothesis 
proposed in the paper, the analysis technique se-
lected is a dependent model based on a linear re-
gression for panel data. The proposed models were 
estimated using fixed effects and random effects, 
testing the validity of the random effects on fixed 
effects by the Hausman test. 
Thus, the expression of the estimated models is as 
follows: 
,543
210
itititit
ititit
YQTOBINGSALES
ROEROAWOMEN
????
???
???????
??????
 (1) 
where i is the company, and t is the year; WOMEN 
is the dependent variable, women percentage in 
decision-making positions; ROA, ROE, GSALES, 
QTOBIN are the independent variables. They repre-
sent company performance; ? are the parameters to 
be estimated; Y corresponds to a vector of other 
explanatory variables defined as control variables; ? 
is the error component. 
3. Results 
The descriptive analysis (Table 2) shows that the 
presence of women in positions of decision-making, 
in companies listed in stock market, is very low. 
That is, between 5.47%-7.16% of the top managers 
and 5.19%-6.85% on the Board of Directors. All 
this shows that the decision-making in Spanish 
listed companies is in the hands of men. 
Table 2. Global situation of the Boards of Directors 
and top management 
 2005 2006 2007 
N. of members on Board of Directors 1.291 1.406 1.328 
Women on Board of Directors 67 95 91 
% 5.19% 6.76% 6.85% 
Total Executive Directors 261 283 249 
Women Executive Directors 8 12 9 
% 3,07% 4,24% 3,61% 
Total Proprietor Directors 562 610 614 
Women Proprietor Directors 37 50 54 
% 6.58% 8.20% 8.79% 
Total Independent Directors 431 459 408 
Women Independent Directors 17 26 25 
 
% 3.94% 5.66% 6.13% 
Women on top management 50 57 70 
% 5.65% 5.47% 7.16% 
This situation is worse when we look at Table 3. We 
realized that most of the companies only have one 
woman. Yet this information could result in a con-
tagion effect. This means that the presence of 
women on Boards facilitates the incorporation of 
new women to them.  
Five women on the Board is the maximum number 
of women. Only two companies have this number. 
However, the list of companies having no women 
on its Board is huge. 2006 is the year with fewer 
women: 60.8% of the companies have not got any 
women on their Board. 2005 is the opposite: 47.3%. 
This means that most of the Boards of the Spanish 
listed companies prefer uniformity, which means 
less gender diversity. 
Table 3. Number of women on Board of Directors 
 2005 2006 2007 
Companies 120 129 124 
Without women 73 61 64 
1 woman 35 53 42 
2 women 7 8 11 
3 women 3 3 3 
4 women 1 3 2 
5 women 1 1 2 
% without women 60.8% 47.3% 51.6% 
% with women 39.2% 52.7% 48.4% 
To study the influence of the explanatory variables 
on the explained variable, we have used the panel 
data methodology. Methodology combines data and 
the structural temporal dimension. Since this is a 
panel data set, we have time series observations on a 
sample of individual units, with observations in the 
period of 2005-2007 for the 294 items that make up 
our study sample (Arellano and Bover, 1990). 
The main objective when we apply this method is to 
perform a dynamic analysis incorporating the tem-
poral dimension of the data. We consider the obser-
vations of a group of individuals over a period of 
time so that we can see certain aspects that un-
equally affect the companies included in our sample. 
These are invariant in time and directly affect the 
decisions they make. In other words, we can observe 
the effects on the company. 
The first step in a panel data analysis is to verify the 
existence of firm effects. That is why, we perform the 
Breusch and Pagan test (1980) or the Lagrangiano 
multiplier. With this we test if the variance of firm 
effects is significantly different from zero. After per-
forming the Breusch and Pagan test on the existing 
data in our study sample (Table 4) we conclude that 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
204 
there are business effects on our study, as there is a 
variance in them, so that the characteristics of each 
company influence the dependent variable. 
Table 4. Results of Breusch and Pagan test 
 Var sd = sqrt (Var) 
Women 81. 40074 9.022236 
e 2.595896 5.094994 
u 4.841754 6.958272 
Chi² = 47.25 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
The next step is to determine whether such effects are 
fixed or random, so we conducted the estimations of 
fixed effects and random effects. Knowing that the 
consistent estimations are the fixed effects estimations 
and the more efficient estimates are the random ef-
fects. To answer the question of whether consistent 
and efficient estimates are significantly different, we 
introduce the Hausman test (1978). This test compares 
the model estimates of fixed effects and random ef-
fects. If it found systematic differences we can under-
stand that there are a correlation between error and the 
business effects, so we should continue with the con-
sistent estimates, that is, fixed effects estimations. 
Once our data was tested with the Hausman test, 
what we obtained was that Prob > Chi2 = 0.0004. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
effects are random effects company and accept the 
alternative hypothesis. For this reason, we conclude 
that we should continue with the fixed effects esti-
mates of our multiple linear regression models. 
To correct the problems of autocorrelation, hetero-
scedasticity and multicollinearity we have obtained 
robust estimates of our multiple linear regression 
models. Our empirical results are thus robust, and 
the results for fixed effects are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Independent variable coefficients and  
control for robust fixed effects model 
 Coef. t P > |t| 
ROA -.0559813 -1.61 0.111 
ROE -.0140456 -0.51 0.610 
GSALES .0011005 7.24 0.000 
QTOBIN -1.448.292 -0.41 0.679 
SECTOR Omitted   
SIZE 1.010.071 2.49 0.015 
BDTMSIZE -.3292954 -3.28 0.002 
DUALITY 1.125.436 0.56 0.580 
MEETINGS .8131927 2.75 0.007 
PERNONEXE .0163363 0.18 0.855 
Thus, the presence of women in the decision-
making positions of the companies is due to firm 
size, the size of Board of Directors and the number 
of meetings of the Board throughout the year. Fur-
thermore, and confirming previous studies in the 
literature, we do not assert that there is a direct rela-
tionship between the presence of women in a company 
and its success or increase in performance, therefore 
accepting the null hypothesis initially stated. 
Conclusions  
This work, as an extension of previous studies, has 
analyzed the effect that the presence of women on 
the Board of Directors has on the result of compa-
nies being expressed through different concept ac-
counting ratios and market value. Specifically, we 
have analyzed the organizational environments that 
facilitate the performance of their duties. 
In recent years, the composition of the Board of 
Directors has received special attention because of 
its impact on Board independence and better moni-
toring of managers. Among the issues discussed 
with respect to this composition, gender diversity is 
especially outstanding. This can become a competi-
tive advantage and a source of business value. In-
dustrial complementarities between men and women 
and perspectives that diversity provides in deliberative 
processes can lead to a broader base of knowledge, 
creativity and innovation. Consequently, a diverse 
team will present a better preparation for better deci-
sion making and problem solving. 
However, diversity also entails the possible emer-
gence of a greater number of conflicts and a possi-
ble slowdown in decision making, which can be 
particularly bad in competitive environments in 
which speed may be crucial in making decisions. 
The empirical evidence is not conclusive about the 
impact of gender diversity on corporate governance, 
on financial performance and business value, often 
yielding no direct effect on various measures of 
profitability. 
The factors that motivate the inclusion of women in 
business are the size of the company, the size of the 
Board of Directors and the number of meetings of 
the Board throughout the year. However, there is not 
a direct relationship between business success and 
the presence of women on the Board of Directors, 
confirming previous results that were obtained in 
the literature. 
There are several limitations to this study that 
should be considered for future works. First, the 
study is focused on companies listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange. These are large companies, which 
may be those in which there is potentially greater 
gender diversity on Boards and in top management. 
And second, we have not taken into account the 
behavioral differences between the women and men 
of the top management and board, as it would appear 
that the fact that there is a correlation between gender 
diversity and success may be due to the inclusion of 
women who are less skilled in business. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
205 
References 
1. Adams, R.B. and Ferreira, D. (2004). “Gender diversity in the boardroom”, ECGI Working Paper Series in Fi-
nance 58, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=594506.pdf. 
2. Aguilera, R.V., Filatotchev I., Gospel H. and Jackson, G. (2008). An Organizational Approach to Comparative 
Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities, Organization Science. Vol. 19, No. 3, May-
June 2008, 475-492. 
3. Arellano, M., Bover, O. (1990). “La econometría de datos de panel”, Investigaciones Económicas, 14, Vol. 1, 3-45. 
4. Berman, S.L.; Wicks, A.C., Kotha, S. and Jones, T.M. (1999). “Does stakeholder orientation matter? The relation-
ship between stakeholder management models and firm financial performance”, Academy of Management Journal, 
42 (5), 488-506. 
5. Bonn, I., Yoshikawa T., and Phan P.H. (2004). “Effects of board structure on firm performance: a comparison 
between Japan and Australia”, Asian Business & Management, 3, 105-125. 
6. Bozec, R., Dia, M. (2007), “Board Structure and Firm Technical Efficiency: Evidence from Canadian State-owned 
Enterprises”, European Journal of Operational Research, 177, 1734-1750. 
7. Breusch, T., Pagan, A. (1980). “The Lagrange multiplier and its applications to model specification in economet-
rics”, Review of Economics. 
8. Bushman, R.M. and Smith, A. J. (2001). “Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance”, Journal 
of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 32, No. 1-3, December.  
9. Carrasco, A. and Laffarga, J. (2006). “Los códigos de buen gobierno y la diversidad”, 12 Encuentro ASEPUC, 
Universidad de Burgos. 
10. (2007a). “La diversidad de género en el Código Unificado español y la práctica empresarial”, Pecvnia, 4, 1-25. 
11. (2007b). “La diversidad en el código de buen gobierno español”, en AYALA, J.C. y grupo de investigación FEDRA 
(editores), Conocimiento, innovación y emprendedores. Camino al futuro, Universidad de la Rioja, 3, 349-3365. 
12. Carter, D.A. Simkins, B.J. and Simpson, W.G. (2003). “Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value”, 
The Financial Review, 38 (1), 33-53. 
13. Coles, J.W., & Hesterly, W.S. (2000). Independence of the chairman and board composition: firm choices and 
shareholder value, Journal of Management, 26 (2), 195-214. 
14. Core, J.E., Guay, W.R. and Rusticus, T.O. (2006), “Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An exami-
nation of firm operating performance and investors’ expectations”, The Journal of Finance, 61 (2), 655-687. 
15. De Luis, P., Martínez, A., Pérez, M. and Vela, M.J. (2007). “La diversidad de género en la alta dirección de las 
mayores empresas españolas”, Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, 13 (2), 33-53. 
16. Erhardt, N.L., Werbel, J.D. and Shrader, C.B. (2003). “Board of director diversity and firm financial perform-
ance”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11 (2), 102-111. 
17. Fernández, E., Gómez, S. and Cuervo, A. (2004). “The stock market reaction on the introduction of best practices 
codes by Spanish firms”, Corporante Governance: An International Review, 12 (1), 29-46. 
18. Forbes, D.P. and Milliken F.J. (1999). “Cognition and corporate governance: understanding boards of directors as 
strategic decision-making groups”, Academy of Management Review, 24 (3), 489-505. 
19. Fryxell, G.E. and Lerner, L.D. (1989). “Contrasting corporate profiles: women and minority representation in top 
management positions”, Journal of Business Ethics, 8 (5), 341-352. 
20. Gabrielsson, J. and Huse, M. (2004). “Context, behavior and evolution: challenges in research on boards and gov-
ernance”, International Studies in Management and Organization, 34, 11-36. 
21. Hausman, J.A. (1978). “Specification test in econometrics”, Econometrica, Vol. 46, 1251-1271. 
22. Heidrick & Struggles (2005). “Corporate governance in Europe: What’s the outlook?”, www.heidrick.com. 
23. Hillman, A.J., Cannella, A.A. and Harris, I.C. (2002). “Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: how do 
directors differ?” Journal of Management, 28, 747-763. 
24. Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T. (2003). “Board of directors and firm performance: integrating agency and resource 
dependence perspectives”, Academy of Management Review, 28 (3), 383-396. 
25. Ibrahim, N.A. and Angelidis, J.P. (1994). “Effect of board members’ gender on corporate social responsiveness 
orientation”, Journal of Applied Business Research, 10 (1), 35-40. 
26. Kang, H., Cheng, M. and Gray, S.J. (2007). “Corporate governance and board composition: diversity and inde-
pendence of Australian boards”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15 (2), 194-207. 
27. Kiel, G.C. and Nicholson, G.J. (2003). “Board composition and corporate performance: how the Australian ex-
perience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
11 (3), 189-205. 
28. Marimuthu, M. (2008). “Ethnic Diversity on Boards of Directors and Its Implications on Firm Financial Perform-
ance”, The Journal of International Social Research, Vol. 1/4, Summer, 431-445. 
29. Mateos, R., Escot, L. and Gimeno, R. (2006). “Análisis de la presencia de mujeres en los Consejos de Administra-
ción de las 1000 mayores empresas españolas”, Documento de trabajo, Universidad San Pablo. 
30. Milliken, F.J. and Martins, I.L. (1996). “Searching for common treads: understanding the multiple effects of diver-
sity in organizational groups”, Academy of Management Journal, 21 (2), 402-433. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
206 
31. Oakley, J.G. (2000). “Gender-based barriers to senior management positions: understanding the scarcity of female 
CEOs”, Journal of Business Ethics, 27 (4), 321-334. 
32. Olcese, A., Bescós, M., Botín-Sanz, A.P., De La Cruz, M.V., Jiménez, I. and Ureta, J.C. (2005). “Diversidad de 
género en los consejos de administración de las sociedades cotizadas y Cajas de Ahorro españolas”, Papeles de la 
Fundación n 12, Fundación de Estudios Financieros, Madrid. 
33. Pearce, J., Zahra, S. (1992). “Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective”, Journal of Manage-
ment Studies, 29 (4), 411-438. 
34. Pelled, L.H. (1996). “Demographic diversity, conflict, and work group outcomes: an intervening process theory”, 
Organization Science, 7 (6), 615-631. 
35. Pelled, L.H., Eisenhardt, K.M. and Xing, K.R. (1999). “Exploring the black box: an analysis of work group diver-
sity, conflict, and performance”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (1), 1-28. 
36. Peterson, C.A. and Philpot, J. (2007). “Women’s roles on U.S. Fortune 500 boards: director expertise and commit-
tee memberships”, Journal of Business Ethics, 72, 177-196. 
37. Randøy, T., Thomsen, S. and Oxelheim, L. (2006). A Nordic perspective on corporate board diversity, Nordic 
Innovation Centre. 
38. Roberts, P.W. and Dowling, G.R. (2002). “Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 23, 1077-1093. 
39. Rose, C. (2007). “Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish evidence”, Corpo-
rate Governance: an International Review, 15 (2), 404-413. 
40. Rosenzweig, P. (1998). “Managing the new global workforce: Fostering diversity, forging consistency”, European 
Management Journal, 16 (6), 644-652. 
41. Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P. and Hu, Y. (2006). “The determinants and effects of board nomina-
tion committees”, Journal of Management Governance, 10, 119-148. 
42. Shrader, C.B., Blackburn, V.B. and Iles, P. (1997). “Women in management and firm financial performance: An 
explorative study”, Journal of Managerial Issues, 9 (3), 355-372. 
43. Siciliano, J.I. (1996). The relationship of board member diversity to organizational performance, Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics, 15, 12, 1313-1320. 
44. Smith, E. (2007). “Gender influence on firm-level entrepreneurship through the power structure of boards”, 
Women in Management Review, 22 (3), 168-186. 
45. Tacheva, S. and Huse, M. (2006). “Women directors and board task performance: mediating and moderating ef-
fects of board working style”, European Academy of Management Conference, February, Oslo. 
46. Van Der Walt, N. and Ingley, C. (2003). “Board dynamics and the influence of professional background, gender 
and ethnic diversity of directors”, Corporate Governance: an International Review, 11 (3), 218-234. 
47. Voordeckers, W., Van Gils A. and Van Den Heuvel, J. (2007). “Board composition in small and medium-sized 
family firms”, Journal of Small Business Management, 45 (1), 137-156. 
48. Webb, E. (2004). “An examination of socially responsible firms’ board structure”, Journal of Management and 
Governance, 8, 255-277. 
49. Zahra, S. and Stanton, W. (1988). “The Implications of Board of Directors: Composition for Corporate Strategy 
and Performance”, International Journal of Management, 5, 261-272. 
Appendix. Sectors classification of the Madrid Stock Exchange 
 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
207 
 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
208 
 
 
 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2011 
209 
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